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Abstract 
 
In most activity-based financing systems, payers set prices reactively based on historical 
averages of hospital reported costs. If hospitals respond to prices, payers might set prices 
proactively to affect the volume of particular treatments or clinical practice. We evaluate the 
effects of a unique initiative in England in which the price offered to hospitals for discharging 
patients on the same day as a particular procedure was increased by 24% while the price for 
inpatient treatment remained unchanged. Using national hospital records for 205,784 patients 
admitted for the incentivised procedure and 838,369 patients admitted for a range of non-
incentivised procedures between 1st December 2007 and 31st March 2011, we consider 
whether this price change had the intended effect and/or produced unintended effects. We 
find that the price change led to an almost six percentage point increase in the daycase rate 
and an eleven percentage point increase in the planned daycase rate. Patients benefited from a 
lower proportion of procedures reverted to open surgery during a planned laparoscopic 
procedure and from a reduction in long stays. There was no evidence that readmission and 
death rates were affected. The results suggest that payers can set prices proactively to 
incentivise hospitals to improve quality. 
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Introduction 
The use of financial incentives to influence individual and organisational behaviour is 
widespread in the private sector. However, the trade-off between risk and incentives, the 
crowding-out of hospitals’ motivation and the multiplicity of outcomes that can cause effort 
diversion are some of the problems that cast doubt on the applicability of such incentives to 
the healthcare sector (Baker 1992; Burgess & Ratto 2003; Dixit 2002; Goddard et al. 1998; 
Grout et al. 2000). 
Most developed countries’ healthcare systems have now moved away from paying 
hospitals using retrospective cost reimbursement or prospective budgets towards activity-
based financing (Busse, 2012). The objectives of activity-based financing are primarily to 
increase productivity, reduce costs and improve efficiency. Under activity-based financing, 
treatment episodes are grouped into categories with similar expected resource needs (often 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs)) and hospitals are reimbursed based on the volumes of 
these categories of treatment episodes that they provide. In most systems, the rate of 
reimbursement, or tariff, is based on historical values of the average costs of providing each 
type of treatment episode reported by hospitals (Busse 2012).  
In England, activity-based financing (called Payment by Results, PbR) was introduced in 
2003/04 (Farrar et al. 2009; Street & Maynard 2007). The main purpose was to reduce 
waiting times by incentivising hospitals to increase supply, but it was also intended that this 
system would support the introduction of competition and patient choice (as ‘money followed 
the patient’) and lead to increases in efficiency.  
Originally, the Department of Health (DH) hoped that hospitals would compete for 
patients on the basis of quality and that the introduction of PbR would lead to improvements 
in quality. However, despite evidence that quality was unaffected by the introduction of PbR 
(Farrar et al. 2009), the DH became concerned that hospitals might reduce quality to keep 
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their costs below the tariff and made a commitment in 2008 to make a proportion of hospital 
incomes conditional on quality (Department of Health 2008). 
As a result of this commitment, the DH experimented with a new method of setting prices 
in April 2010. This policy was called Best Practice Tariffs (BPTs) and was introduced 
initially for a small number of healthcare interventions. For these interventions, instead of 
basing prices reactively on the average costs reported by hospitals, BPTs were set proactively 
to reflect the costs of delivering best practice. For the remaining interventions, prices 
continued to be set reactively, based on the average historical costs reported by hospitals. 
Most of the literature has considered the unintended effects of price changes on the care 
provided by hospitals. The main challenge for this literature is finding an exogenous source 
of variation in prices not related to changes in hospital costs and hence not biased by reverse 
causality. Dafny (2005) exploited the 1988 U.S. policy change that generated a large and 
exogenous price change. She examined the impact of a re-classification of the DRG structure 
wherein the age criterion was removed as an indicator of ‘complications’ from the price 
schedule. There was evidence of upcoding of complications where this had the largest impact 
on price, but no effect of the price changes on volumes and intensity. Dafny (2005) therefore 
concluded that prices could not be used to affect quality.  
Other papers have concentrated on the effect of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) in 1997, 
which led to a general but non-uniform change in prices across hospitals and activities in the 
US. Seshamani et al. (2006) found no differences in changes in 30-day mortality rates 
between hospitals expected to be affected to different degrees by the expected reduction in 
revenue. Lindrooth et al. (2007) found that the hospitals with the highest proportions of 
Medicare patients reduced treatment intensity at higher quantiles in the more affected DRGs. 
Wu and Shen (2011) examined the longer-term effect on mortality following acute 
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myocardial infarction. They found that an adverse effect became evident in 2001-2005 and 
that hospitals affected most by the BBA reduced nursing input levels in the longer-term.  
There is therefore mixed evidence of the impact of price changes on the quality of care 
provided by hospitals. Our application differs from previous papers by considering hospital 
responses to an exogenous, proactive price change designed to change clinical practice in a 
highly transparent manner. The link between revenue and the incentivised dimension of 
clinical practice is easy to measure and observe. The quasi-experimental nature of the BPT, 
implemented for a specific clinical procedure and not for others, allows us to estimate 
unbiased effects of hospital responses to price changes. 
In the first year of the policy, the DH experimented with three models of BPTs, which 
were applied to different groups of patients (Audit Commision 2012). These models: (i) paid 
more for treatment as a daycase compared to treatment as an inpatient; (ii) paid more for 
achievement of quality standards; or (iii) did not pay hospitals for excessive outpatient visits 
before or after a procedure. We focus on the procedure for which additional payment was 
paid for daycase treatment in the first year, cholecystectomy or the removal of the gall 
bladder. This policy differed from previous arrangements for cholecystectomy, which were 
continued for all other treatments, of paying a single tariff regardless of whether the patient 
was treated as a daycase or had an overnight stay. The stated purpose of this new daycase 
tariff was to improve quality by providing a better patient experience and increasing 
efficiency. This differential pricing model for daycases and inpatient stays was adopted only 
for cholecystectomy in 2010/11 and then 12 additional procedures in 2011/12.  
The aim of this paper is two-fold. We examine (i) whether the new tariff produced the 
intended effect on the proportion of patients treated as daycases; and (ii) whether there were 
unintended effects of the tariff on patient selection, quality and productivity. In order to do 
this, we perform difference-in-differences and differential-spline analyses between the pre-
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2010 payment policy and the post-2010 payment policy. We select a control group 
comprising other procedures for which similar daycase rates are recommended but a separate 
daycase price was not introduced.  
To preface our findings, we show that the tariff achieved its objective as daycase rates 
increased significantly by six percentage points. There is no evidence that the price change 
had a perverse effect on quality in terms of deaths or readmissions following a 
cholecystectomy. The policy significantly reduced the proportion of patients requiring a 
reversion from laparoscopic to an open procedure and those requiring a longer length of stay. 
There is evidence that these effects began when the policy was announced, four months prior 
to the actual proactive price change.  
 
1. The Best Practice Tariff 
1.1. Daycase laparoscopic cholecystectomy 
Cholecystectomy is an operation to remove the gall bladder, a small pouch in the abdomen 
that stores bile. Cholecystectomies are performed under general anaesthetic but can be 
performed laparoscopically (otherwise known as ‘keyhole surgery’) or as open surgery. An 
‘open’ cholecystectomy may be required if the patient has previously had major surgery and 
has extensive abdominal scarring. If complications such as bleeding occur during 
laparoscopic surgery, the surgeon may also have to revert to open surgery. Open surgery 
usually takes longer to perform than keyhole surgery and requires a longer hospital stay. 
Laparoscopic surgery was first performed in 1985 and has become the accepted standard 
(Leeder et al. 2004). The National Health Service (NHS) Institute for Innovation and 
Improvement found that, in 2005/6, 84% of all cholecystectomies were performed 
laparoscopically but the national average daycase rate was just 6.4% (NHS Institute for 
8 
 
Innovation and Improvement 2006). There were substantial variations between hospitals in 
both of these figures.  
Laparoscopic cholecystectomy has been placed on lists of procedures that can be 
performed routinely as a daycase (British Association of Day Surgery 2008; Audit 
Commision 2001). However, a recent Cochrane review has compared the outcomes of patient 
groups receiving laparoscopic cholecystectomy and either discharged as a daycase or kept in 
hospital overnight. The review showed no difference between the two methods of 
management in terms of morbidity, prolongation of length of stay, readmissions, pain, quality 
of life, patient satisfaction or speed of return to normal activity (Gurusamy et al. 2008). The 
clinical evidence that treatment as a daycase is better for patients is therefore ambiguous.  
The financial case that daycase treatment is less costly is also contestable. The NHS 
Institute for Innovation and Improvement developed an optimal ‘pathway of care’ and a wide 
range of recommendations on how this could be delivered in 2006 (NHS Institute for 
Innovation and Improvement 2006). Although daycase treatment reduces some aspects of 
hospital costs by avoiding overnight stays, the recommended pathway requires substantial 
changes to care delivery across a wide range of dimensions that will require capital and 
labour investments. Key considerations include the scheduling of daycase patients earlier in 
the operating list, so as to discharge them on the same day, and having dedicated daycase 
wards and theatres (British Association of Day Surgery 2008; Leeder et al. 2004; Verma et al. 
2011). Clarke et al. (2011) reported that the NHS Institute pathway required more focused 
contacts with potential patients prior to the procedure, expanding the criteria for daycase 
surgery, reducing clerical errors by ensuring that patients were scheduled on morning 
operating lists and reducing conversion rates by increasing the proportion of procedures 
performed by specialist upper gastrointestinal surgeons. Failures to discharge patients as 
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daycases were linked predominantly to uncontrolled pain, nausea, and vomiting, which it was 
thought could be avoided in future by better anaesthesia and pain control.  
Reducing the conversion rate to open surgery can also successfully increase the daycase 
rate. Ballal et al. (2009) found lower conversion rates amongst consultants that performed 
more laparoscopic cholecystectomies, with those performing 70 or more procedures a year 
having the lowest conversion rate. In addition, those surgeons who attempted a higher 
proportion of their cholecystectomies laparoscopically had a lower conversion rate, with the 
surgeons undertaking more than 90% of their work primarily laparoscopically having the 
lowest conversion rate. Successful daycase management of patients following laparoscopic 
surgery may therefore require a re-organisation of work across surgeons alongside other cost-
increasing activities and may not lead to net cost reductions, at least in the short-term. 
Hospitals might therefore need a financial incentive to increase their daycase rate. 
 
1.2. The price change 
The Best Practice Tariff for cholecystectomy, introduced in April 2010, aimed to 
incentivise hospitals to provide the procedure as a daycase. The new structure of the tariff 
was announced in December 2009 (Department of Health 2009) and the full details including 
prices were published later (Department of Health 2010). Our analysis period begins 24 
months before the policy was first announced in December 2007 and ends 12 months after 
the policy was introduced in March 2011. This provides a four-month period after the policy 
was announced and before it was introduced when hospitals could have anticipated the price 
change, followed by a 12-month period in which hospitals experienced new policy. This 
period of analysis was chosen to give 24 months of data from before the policy was 
announced but not to include earlier periods when PbR was not yet fully implemented 
(Department of Health 2012).  
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Table I shows the prices that were offered for cholecystectomies in each financial year 
from 2007/8 to 2010/11. In all years, higher prices were offered for patients reported by 
hospitals as having complications. Until 2008/9, patients aged 70 years and over were paid at 
the higher rate regardless of whether or not they were reported to have complications. This 
was abandoned in 2009/10. A substantial decrease in price occurred between 2008/09 and 
2009/10 when the classification of treatments into HRGs was updated from Version 3.5 to 
Version 4. In 2010/11, the pricing structure for cholecystectomies was changed and 
discriminated between daycase and inpatient procedures. Between 2009/10 and 2010/11 there 
was a £4 increase in the price for inpatient procedures, regardless of whether or not they had 
complications. Daycase cholecystectomies were paid at a 24% higher rate than in 2009/10. 
(Table I) 
To qualify for the Best Practice Tariff, hospitals needed to both schedule the patient as a 
daycase and discharge the patient on the day the procedure was undertaken. This price 
change differs from previous ones as it was coupled with a well-publicised policy change and 
a published target for the daycase rate of 60% (Department of Health 2010).  
 
2. Possible behavioural impacts of the tariff 
2.1. Intended effects of BPT 
We assess whether the policy achieved its principal objective by looking at the effect of 
the BPT on the incentivised task, the proportion of cholecystectomies performed as a daycase 
procedure. In order to be eligible for the higher price, hospitals need to both plan and treat 
patients as daycases. This criterion also ensures that the procedure had to be laparoscopic, as 
an open procedure will always require an overnight stay.  
We examine the effect of the tariff on the proportion of all episodes that were planned and 
delivered as daycases. We then examine changes in the proportion of procedures performed 
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laparoscopically. We would expect that the price change would incentivise the targeted 
clinical practice by increasing the daycase proportion. We might also expect more 
laparoscopic procedures, though the laparoscopic surgery rate is already high. 
 
2.2. Unintended effects of BPT 
One of the problems with financial incentives is that hospitals might try to achieve the 
objective of the policy in ways that were not intended by the policy itself. For instance, Dafny 
(2005) considered two possible responses: i) “nominal” responses, i.e. those that involve a 
change in hospitals’ coding practices; and ii) “real” responses, i.e. those that affect 
admissions and the intensity of care provided. Given the relatively substantial revenue gains 
from achieving the BPT, hospitals could try to increase the proportion of daycase 
laparoscopic cholecystectomies in several ways.  
Hospitals could make “real” changes as follows. First, they could reprioritise patients. 
Reprioritisation is reflected by inappropriate preferential treatment given to healthier patients, 
but hospitals could also select patients who were previously deemed to be too risky for a 
daycase cholecystectomy treatment. We assess the extent of patient selection by looking at 
the effect of BPT on the age and gender composition of treated patients. Second, the tariff 
could have a perverse effect on quality. For instance, hospitals could make more mistakes 
leading to more deaths, fail to improve post-procedure care leading to longer lengths of stay 
for some patients, and take risks either with the discharge decision leading to higher 
probability of readmission or with selecting higher risk patients and then reverting to open 
cholecystectomy. Third, they could respond to the price change by changing productivity. 
They could change the volume of treated patients or make patients wait longer until a slot in a 
dedicated daycase facility with a surgeon undertaking laparoscopic procedures is available.  
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Hospitals could also make “nominal” changes to their behaviour in order to qualify for the 
tariff. First, they may increase their planned daycase rate as a means to capture as many 
procedures as possible within the new tariff. This could mean an increase in the number of 
planned daycases that do not result in a daycase cholecystectomy. Second, hospitals may 
increase the proportion of patients that they code as having complications as they are not paid 
less for inpatient care if patients are classified as having complications. 
 
3. Summary statistics 
3.1. Definition of the sample and variables of interest 
Healthcare records were obtained from Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for the 40 
months between the 1st December 2007 and 31st March 2011. These data are available upon 
request from the NHS Information Centre for Health and Social Care. They contain 
information on patient characteristics, diagnoses, type of admission, readmissions, discharges 
and lengths of stay for each treatment episode provided by hospitals in England. 
We only use data for patients admitted electively, funded by the NHS, and with an 
admission date no earlier than 1st December 2007. Episodes that involve a cholecystectomy 
were selected using the OPCS-4 codes (J183, J188, J189 and J268). Episodes that involved 
procedures that were not subjected to the change in tariff but could be performed as daycases 
were selected using OPCS-4 codes from the BADS Directory of Procedures (British 
Association of Day Surgery 2008). This directory contains the BADS recommendations for 
which surgeries are appropriate as a daycase or short stay. The procedure codes used for the 
control group are given in Table II. The target for the daycase proportion for 
cholecystectomies is 60%. As only seven procedures in the BADS directory had a 
recommended daycase rate of exactly 60%, we selected a list of 74 control procedures with 
recommended daycase proportions of 60% +/- 15%.  The control group includes procedures 
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undertaken in the following eight specialities: Ear, Nose and Throat; General Surgery; 
Gynaecology; Ophthalmology; Orthopaedic; Urology; Vascular and Medical. We removed 
episodes that included both a cholecystectomy code and a control procedure code.  
The dataset was then aggregated by organisation, month of admission and whether the 
episode was for cholecystectomy or a control procedure in one of the eight specialties. 169 of 
the organisations are NHS or Foundation Trusts, 21 are independent sector hospitals and 15 
are Primary Care Trusts that provide care directly rather than commission it.  
The variables we use to determine the behavioural effects of the tariff are defined as 
follows. Daycases are defined as patients who have been admitted for treatment just for the 
day. We generated the daycase proportion as the proportion of total episodes planned and 
delivered as a daycase. The planned daycase proportion is the number of episodes whose 
intended clinical management was to treat as a daycase as a proportion of total episodes. The 
laparoscopic proportion is the share of episodes that have the accompanying procedure code 
(OPCS4 - Y75.2) indicating a laparoscopic approach, as a proportion of total episodes. 
Patient mix is defined by the mean age measured in years and by the proportion of male 
patients. Patient complexity is measured by the mean number of co-morbidities recorded in 
the episode.  
Amongst episodes planned as daycases, the OPCS4 code Y71.4 indicates those procedures 
where the surgeon has reverted to open surgery. The readmission rate is the proportion of 
patients discharged alive who were admitted as an emergency within two days of discharge. 
Given that these procedures should be treated as daycases or with a one-night stay, we 
defined long stays as the proportion of patients whose spell lasted for more than one night. 
The death rate is the proportion of all episodes from which the patient is discharged dead. 
Volume is the number of episodes involving a cholecystectomy or a control procedure 
performed by a given hospital in a given month. 
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The waiting time is the time that elapses between the decision to put the patient on a 
waiting list for admission to the point at which the patient is actually admitted. Due to 
changes in national waiting times targets, we begin the analysis of waiting times in April 
2008. This is the first year that the 18-week waiting time policy was implemented 
(Department of Health 2006). To account for a small number of very large values, we analyse 
the median waiting time for each hospital-month cell.  
The HRG tariff for each episode is obtained from HRG version 3.5 for episodes in the 
2007/8 and 2008/9 financial years and from HRG version 4 for episodes in 2009/10 and 
2010/11. The average HRG tariff for each year is calculated for each control procedure 
specialty group and for cholecystectomy. This was calculated using the annual composition 
of HRGs assigned to the control procedures within each of the eight specialties at the national 
level to ensure that the price variable was independent of hospital and monthly variations in 
case mix.  
 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table III displays the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis, 
summarised over four periods of time: two 12-month periods before the policy was 
announced, the anticipation period and the BPT period. Panel A) shows figures for the 
procedure exposed to the BPT and panel B) focuses on the control procedures.  
In general, the daycase and planned daycase proportions are higher amongst control 
procedures than cholecystectomy, but it is amongst cholecystectomies that there is the largest 
increase over time, particularly in the anticipation and BPT periods. The laparoscopic 
proportion is high and stable for cholecystectomies and much lower for the control 
procedures.  
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The mean age and proportion of male patients differs between the two groups, but is stable 
over time for both groups. On average, patients undergoing cholecystectomy have similar 
numbers of co-morbidities and have a higher proportion of procedures reverted to open 
surgery. The readmission rate increases for cholecystectomies for the first two periods and 
increases over the whole period for the controls. The proportion of patients requiring a 
hospital stay longer than one night decreases in both groups. The death rate is higher for 
cholecystectomies than for the controls and falls between the first two periods, followed by 
increases in the death rate in the anticipation and BPT periods.  
The median waiting time is higher for cholecystectomies than for the control procedures. 
The average price for cholecystectomy falls in the first three periods and then increases in the 
BPT year. For the controls, the average price increases in the first three periods but decreases 
in the BPT year. We control for these changes in price, which are reactive to the changes in 
average costs reported by hospitals, by including the price as an explanatory variable.  
To summarise, the crude statistics show an increase in the proportion of daycases for the 
procedure exposed to the BPT, the intended effect of the policy. There is little evidence of 
unintended effects but, given the other differences between cholecystectomies and the control 
procedures outlined above, a difference-in-difference analysis is required to establish the 
causal effect of the policy. 
(Table III) 
3.3. Graphical analyses  
Figure I displays trends in daycase rates for both cholecystectomy and the basket of 
control procedures over the 40-month period. The vertical lines indicate the months when 
BPT was announced (at the 25th month, December 2009) and then introduced (at the 29th 
month, in April 2010). We provide charts for the six least volatile of the 12 outcome 
variables.   
16 
 
Cholecystectomy and control procedures seem to trend in a similar way for daycases and 
planned daycase proportion prior to the announcement of the BPT. We formally test this 
common trend hypothesis below. The gap in outcomes between cholecystectomy and control 
procedures widens after the BPT was announced showing a potential effect of the policy. 
Cholecystectomies and control procedures do not appear to follow common trends in the 
pre-announcement period for the laparoscopic proportion and long stays in hospital. Whilst 
the reversion rate decreases noticeably around the time of the policy announcement, 
laparoscopic procedures were increasing for several months before the BPT was announced. 
The proportion of patients requiring hospital stays longer than one night was decreasing prior 
to the BPT and this decline continued afterwards. There does appear to be a common trend in 
waiting times prior to the new policy. Cholecystectomy waiting times are higher than the 
control procedures throughout the period, and this difference appears to widen following the 
introduction of the BPT.  
 (Figure I) 
4. Estimation methods 
4.1. Difference in Differences  
We analyse the intended and unintended effects of introducing BPTs on several outcome 
variables, Y, using a difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology. We estimate the 
following equation using Weighted Least Squares: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾1𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑖𝑡
′ + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑡
′′ + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                   (1) 
 
where the subscript i=1,…,I indicates cholecystectomy (i=1) or control procedures grouped 
by specialty (i=2,..,I); j=1,...,J indicates the J hospital Trusts; t indexes the month of 
observation; 𝛼𝑖𝑗 are fixed-effects for Trust-specialty combinations; 𝑇 are month dummies; 𝑃 
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is the HRG tariff; and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the error term. We define 𝐷𝑖𝑡
′′ = 𝟏[𝑖 = 1] ∗ 𝑇 [𝐴𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑙 2010 −
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 2011] as the effect of the price change introduced by the BPT, with 𝛽2 being the DiD 
coefficient of interest. 
There are three weaknesses to the DiD approach. Firstly, the unobserved temporary 
component has to be unrelated to the timing of the introduction of the BPT for 
cholecystectomy procedures for DiD to be consistent. This is the so-called Ashenfelter’s dip 
and occurs when a temporary dip in the cholecystectomies procedures is observed before the 
BPT was introduced (Heckman & Smith 1994). In this case, the DiD estimator is likely to 
overestimate the impact of treatment. We define 𝐷𝑖𝑡
′ = 𝟏[𝑖 = 1] ∗ 𝑇[𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 2009 −
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 2010] as an interaction between cholecystectomy and the anticipation period. This 
formally tests for a response from providers in anticipation of the policy once it is announced.  
The second weakness relates to the common trend effect. The DiD common trends 
assumption is violated if the cholecystectomies and control procedures are affected by 
different shocks or if common macro shocks affect the cholecystectomies and control 
procedures differently. We perform a test for common trends between cholecystectomies and 
control procedures by testing the significance of the interaction between the cholecystectomy 
dummy and a linear trend measuring the number of months since the beginning of the data 
period to the month before the policy was announced. For the common trends assumption to 
be satisfied we have to fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient measuring the 
difference between control procedures and cholecystectomy is zero. This was undertaken for 
each dependent variable separately.  
The final assumption requires that the composition of the cholecystectomies and control 
procedures with respect to the fixed effects term must remain unchanged to ensure before-
after comparability. This is the compositional effect over time. 
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4.2. Splines 
Analysis using the DiD method tests for changes in the level of an outcome resulting from 
a policy change. To test for changes in the slope or trend of an outcome over time, spline 
regression can be used (Poirier & Garber 1974). This involves the creation of knots at the 
points at which the change in outcome is expected to occur. We created knots at December 
2009 (month 25) for the anticipation effect and April 2010 (month 29) for the BPT effect. We 
estimate the following equation using Weighted Least Squares: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾1𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑘 ∑ 𝟏
2
𝑘=0 [𝑡 > 𝑡𝑘] ⋅ (𝑡 − 𝑡𝑘) +  
𝟏[𝑖 = 1] ⋅ 𝛽2𝑘 ∑ 𝟏
2
𝑘=0 [𝑡 > 𝑡𝑘] ⋅ (𝑡 − 𝑡𝑘) + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡      (2) 
 
where t0=0, t1=24 and t2=28 and the other variables are defined as above. 𝛽20 measures the 
difference in trend between the control procedures and cholecystectomy in the pre-
anticipation period. Its magnitude and statistical significance are indications of the validity of 
the common trends assumption. 𝛽11and 𝛽12 capture changes in trend for the control group at 
the two knots. 𝛽21 and 𝛽22 capture additional changes in trend for cholecystectomy at the two 
knots. 𝛽21 measures the change in trend in the outcome for cholecystectomy that occurs in 
the anticipation period. 𝛽22  measures any additional change in trend in the BPT period 
compared to the anticipation period, with 𝛽21 + 𝛽22 capturing the change in trend compared 
to the pre-announcement period.  
 
5. Results 
5.1. Difference-in-differences regression results 
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The pre-trend tests indicate that a control group consisting of procedures from all of the 
eight specialties did not follow the same trend as cholecystectomy for daycases prior to the 
announcement of the BPT. Procedures in gynaecology contributed to the test failing more 
than any other specialty. We proceed by presenting results for a control group where the 
Gynaecology procedures have been removed. This results in a basket of controls of 838,369 
episodes grouped into seven specialties and 205,784 cholecystectomy episodes. The appendix 
contains results for each of the eight specialties individually.  
In Table IV we present the DiD estimation results for each outcome variable. The results 
shaded in bold are those where the assumption of common pre-trends is satisfied. We find 
that the BPTs have achieved their intended effects. The daycase proportion increased by 5.8 
percentage points. The planned daycase rate also increased by 11.1 percentage points. There 
is significant evidence of an anticipation effect following the announcement of the policy of 
1.7 percentage points for daycases and 4.2 percentage points for planned daycases.  
BPTs have achieved their intended effect without any perverse effect on quality. The 
reversion rate fell by 4 per 1,000 in anticipation of the policy and by a further 0.7 per 1,000 
when the policy came into effect. The proportion of patients needing a stay longer than one 
night fell by 2.2 percentage points in the anticipation period and by a further 2.2 (4.4 in total) 
percentage points when the policy started.  There were no statistically significant effects on 
death and readmission rates or the gender mix of the patients.  
The laparoscopic proportion, the mean number of comorbidities, mean age, volume and 
median waiting times do not satisfy the pre-trends assumptions with the basket of control 
procedures. The analysis by individual procedure group shown in the Appendix allows us to 
comment on the effect of the BPT on these outcomes where the pre-trends assumption was 
satisfied. The laparoscopic proportion increased compared to two out of the three specialities, 
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the mean number of comorbidities compared to four out of six specialities, the mean age 
decreased compared to four out of five specialities, provider volume increased compared to 
four out of five specialties and the median waiting time increased compare to all three 
specialities where the pre-trend assumption was satisfied.  
The analysis by individual procedure group shown in the Appendix also acts as a 
robustness check for the outcomes where a significant effect is found using the control group. 
The effect for daycases is positive and statistically significant in all the specialties where the 
pre-trends assumption is satisfied. The same is true for planned daycases.  The effect for 
reversions is negative and statistically significant in all specialities. The effect on the 
proportion of patients needing a stay longer than one night is negative in all specialities and 
statistically significant in three out of five cases.  
5.2. Spline regression results 
The results for the spline regressions are given in Table V. The coefficients which 
measure the effect of the policy are those on the additional anticipation and BPT splines for 
cholecystectomy. Emboldened cells indicate results for models in which the pre-trends 
assumption is satisfied. As an example, Figure II plots the predicted daycase rate against 
month and shows the change in slope at the knots when the policy was announced and then 
implemented.  
The results indicate that there was a significant increase in the trend for daycase 
procedures when the policy was announced. However, this increase in trend slows once the 
policy came into effect, as signalled by the negative coefficient on the BPT spline. Overall, 
however, the trend in the daycase rate remains higher than in the pre-anticipation period for 
cholecystectomy and the same as in the pre-anticipation period for the controls. Planned 
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daycases also show a positive change in trend in the anticipation period which continues into 
the BPT period. The change in slope for the reversion rate occurs in the anticipation period 
and returns close to the pre-announcement trend once the policy was implemented. In 
anticipation of the policy, the trend for the proportion of patients staying over one night 
decreases. This effect is dampened in the BPT period but the sum of the coefficients suggests 
a decrease in trend in the BPT period compared to the pre-announcement period.  As with the 
DiD results, there are no significant changes in death or readmission rates or the gender mix.  
6. Discussion 
Activity-based financing incentivises hospitals to reduce unit costs and may facilitate 
patient choice and competition but, unless demand is responsive to quality, may encourage 
hospitals to reduce quality in order to contain costs. The prices paid in such systems are 
typically based on the average historical costs of treatments reported by hospitals. If hospitals 
respond to prices, payers might consider setting prices proactively to encourage increases in 
volume for particular treatments or to change clinical practice, rather than setting prices 
reactively in response to changes in hospitals ’ reported costs.  
In this paper we considered how hospitals responded to a proactive price change 
introduced for one surgical procedure, cholecystectomy, for all hospitals in England in 
2010/11. This price change encouraged hospitals to both plan and achieve discharge of 
patients on the same day as the surgical procedure was undertaken. This daycase treatment 
was believed to improve patient experience and reduce costs, though the published evidence 
from trials on the effects on patients is equivocal and the initiative required hospitals to make 
substantial capital and labour investments and fundamentally re-organise the way in which 
they provided care. We undertook a difference-in-differences analysis, comparing the 
surgical procedure to which the price change was applied to a control group of other surgical 
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procedures which continued to be priced on a reactive basis. We examined whether the 
proactive price change had the intended effect on patient management and whether hospitals 
reacted in a range of unintended ways. 
This paper provides evidence that the new BPT introduced in 2010 by the Department of 
Health achieved its intended objective. The proportion of patients treated as daycases for 
cholecystectomy increased by over 5.8 percentage points. Reversions to open surgery and 
lengths of stay also fell and there were no indications of negative effects on the quality of 
care or patient outcomes.  
Our study is limited in scope to only the short-term effects of the BPTs. Future research 
will address the question whether proactive price changes can produce persistent changes in 
clinical practice. A further limitation of our current study, which will be addressed in future 
research, is the study of the effect of BPTs on the more recently included procedures. A final 
criticism stems from the argument that the price incentive might have been affected by the 
reputational effect of the daycase rate. As daycase rates were not made public, we can rule 
out that this was the case. However, the change in clinical practice due to pecuniary measures 
might have been coupled with a government target measure being perceived as a mission 
(Besley & Ghatak 2003)  
Our analysis provides evidence that payers can act proactively in their price-setting and 
might expect a substantial response from hospitals. The substantial effect of this pricing 
change may be due to its large magnitude (24%) and the clear link between the tariff structure 
and the changes in care delivery that were required. Payers can also expect hospitals to 
respond in anticipation of a well-publicised change in policy. 
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Table I – Tariff prices for cholecystectomies (2007/8 to 2010/11)  
Financial 
year 
Without complications  With complications 
2007/08 £1,777 (patient <70years and 
without complications) 
£2,328 (patient >69years or with 
complications) 
2008/09 £1,837 (patient <70years and 
without complications) 
£2,371 (patient >69years or with 
complications) 
2009/10 £1,365 (without complications) £2,131 (with complications) 
2010/11 £1,694 (daycase without 
complications)  
£1,369 (inpatient without 
complications) 
£2,164 (open procedure or laparoscopic 
procedure with complications) 
Source: Department of Health (2014) 
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Table II – OPCS codes used for potential control group 
Speciality group (grouping from BADS) OPCS4 procedure code 
Ears, Nose and Throat D141 D142 D144 D148 D149 D16* E025 E026 E031 
E036 E04* E142 
General H511 H59* H601 H602 H603 H608 H609 T21* 
Gynaecology Q075 Q22* Q23* Q24* Q25* Q381 Q382 Q388 Q389 
Q39* Q49* T42* P233 P237 P234 
Ophthalmology C18* C791 C792 
Orthopaedic W283 W051 W55*" 
Urology M441 M442 M662 N27* 
Vascular L741 L742 L84* L85* L871 L872 L873 L874 L875 
L876 L878 L879 
Medical J38* J39* J40* J41* J42* J43* J44* K601 K603 
K601 K603 K608 K609 K611 K613 K618 K619 
Source: British Association of Day Surgery, (2008) 
* = all 4 character codes are used that begin with these 3 characters 
 dropped from preferred control group 
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Table III - Descriptive statistics 
A) Cholecystectomies (to which BPTs were applied)  B) BADS procedures (to which BPTs were not applied) 
  Dec’07-
Nov’08 
Dec’08-
Nov’09 
Dec’09-
Mar’10 
Apr’10-
Mar’11 
Dec’07-
Nov’08 
Dec’08-
Nov’09 
Dec’09-
Mar’10 
Apr’10-
Mar’11 
Daycase proportion 0.180 0.202 0.246 0.300 0.476 0.496 0.510 0.520 
Planned daycase proportion 0.363 0.408 0.473 0.545 0.585 0.605 0.620 0.628 
Laparoscopic proportion 0.862 0.874 0.890 0.898 0.046 0.057 0.063 0.069 
Mean age 51.573 51.426 51.275 51.262 47.776 48.202 48.123 48.346 
Male patient proportion 0.250 0.250 0.256 0.247 0.483 0.477 0.478 0.471 
Number of comorbidities 1.282 1.461 1.540 1.923 1.315 1.482 1.620 2.008 
Reversion rate (per 1000) 35.406 35.408 30.817 30.316 0.746 0.869 0.995 1.062 
Readmission rate (per 1000) 15.910 16.387 16.121 16.501 7.564 7.739 7.798 8.192 
Proportion staying > 1 night 0.299 0.278 0.238 0.220 0.173 0.168 0.161 0.159 
Death rate (per 1000) 1.322 1.022 1.141 1.171 0.515 0.492 0.611 0.573 
HRG tariff (£’000) 2.056 1.988 1.951 1.975 1.470 1.862 2.022 1.726 
Median waiting time (days) 56.000 60.000 65.000 64.500 52.000 54.500 57.000 56.000 
 Note: The first data period for waiting times is the eight months between April and November 2008 to avoid the change in waiting times targets.   
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Table IV– Difference-in-differences regression results using preferred control group 
 Daycase 
proportion 
Planned 
daycase 
proportion 
Laparoscopic 
proportion 
Readmission 
rate 
Number of 
comorbidities 
Reversion 
rate 
Long stay 
proportion  
Death rate Mean age Male 
patient 
proportion 
Volume Median 
waiting 
time 
             
Anticipation 
period 
0.0174* 
(2.07) 
0.0415** 
(3.31) 
0.0202** 
(2.71) 
-0.00329 
(-0.00) 
-0.00907 
(-0.29) 
-4.034* 
(-2.31) 
-0.0226*** 
(-4.34) 
-0.0461 
(-0.12) 
-0.500** 
(-2.74) 
0.00202 
(0.48) 
0.959* 
(2.45) 
2.303 
(1.95) 
             
BPT year 0.0580*** 
(5.93) 
0.111*** 
(7.31) 
0.0317*** 
(3.36) 
-0.0728 
(-0.10) 
0.0157 
(0.51) 
-4.722*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.0438*** 
(-7.99) 
0.0424 
(0.21) 
-0.537*** 
(-4.58) 
0.00149 
(0.48) 
1.119** 
(2.67) 
3.902** 
(2.83) 
             
HRG tariff -0.0156* 
(-2.39) 
-0.0306*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.00981** 
(-2.66) 
-0.543 
(-0.79) 
0.0202 
(0.40) 
-1.047 
(-1.53) 
0.0267** 
(3.21) 
0.0671 
(0.15) 
-0.167 
(-1.09) 
-0.000108 
(-0.04) 
0.381 
(0.84) 
-1.319 
(-1.57) 
             
Observations 47516 47437 47517 46332 47517 47517 47512 47517 47517 47491 47517 42182 
R2 0.817 0.790 0.982 0.089 0.776 0.447 0.743 0.143 0.857 0.709 0.853 0.555 
Note: Preferred control is based on pre-trend tests and consists of 7 out of 8 of the specialties, Gynaecology is dropped.  
Bold cells are where the pre-trend assumption is satisfied.  
All models include 40 month dummies and Trust-specialty fixed effects.  
Observations are Trust-speciality-month combinations. Regressions weighted by volume (except volume regression). 
Provider cluster robust t statistics in parentheses.  
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table V – Spline regression model results using preferred control group 
 Daycase 
proportion 
Planned 
daycase 
proportion 
Laparoscopic 
proportion 
Readmission 
rate 
Number of 
comorbidities 
Reversion 
rate 
Long stay 
proportion  
Death rate Mean 
age 
Male 
patient 
proportion 
Volume Median 
waiting 
time 
Controls             
Linear trend 0.00214*** 
(6.17) 
0.00250*** 
(6.28) 
0.0000313 
(0.72) 
0.0172 
(0.61) 
0.0113*** 
(5.77) 
0.0173* 
(2.00) 
-0.00147*** 
(-5.88) 
-0.00629 
(-0.51) 
0.0176* 
(2.48) 
0.0000320 
(0.18) 
-0.0257 
(-1.79) 
0.143 
(1.52) 
Anticipation spline 0.0000465 
(0.03) 
-0.000657 
(-0.42) 
0.000167 
(1.19) 
-0.0333 
(-0.25) 
0.0354*** 
(5.13) 
-0.0566 
(-1.43) 
0.00152 
(1.46) 
0.0407 
(0.83) 
0.0209 
(0.65) 
-0.000844 
(-1.10) 
0.166* 
(2.43) 
-0.179 
(-0.49) 
BPT spline 0.000856 
(0.63) 
0.00139 
(0.90) 
-0.000285 
(-1.82) 
0.0894 
(0.54) 
-0.0117 
(-1.68) 
0.0405 
(0.96) 
-0.000670 
(-0.71) 
-0.0401 
(-0.95) 
-0.0349 
(-1.02) 
0.000936 
(1.08) 
-0.197** 
(-3.08) 
0.347 
(1.17) 
Additional terms for 
cholecystectomy 
            
Linear trend -0.000203 
(-0.34) 
0.00158 
(1.65) 
0.00159*** 
(3.91) 
0.0813 
(1.17) 
0.00536* 
(2.34) 
0.0417 
(0.43) 
-0.0000832 
(-0.17) 
-0.00474 
(-0.23) 
-0.0200* 
(-2.05) 
0.0000270 
(0.11) 
0.0751* 
(2.45) 
0.183* 
(2.22) 
Anticipation spline 0.00928*** 
(3.87) 
0.0120*** 
(3.39) 
0.000588 
(0.32) 
-0.202 
(-0.54) 
-0.0126 
(-1.42) 
-1.118* 
(-2.25) 
-0.00777*** 
(-3.96) 
0.0682 
(0.62) 
-0.0280 
(-0.57) 
0.000663 
(0.46) 
0.158 
(1.09) 
-0.0322 
(-0.09) 
BPT spline -0.00567* 
(-2.11) 
-0.00772 
(-1.97) 
-0.00133 
(-0.64) 
0.0438 
(0.10) 
0.00470 
(0.48) 
0.967 
(1.70) 
0.00620** 
(3.12) 
-0.0956 
(-0.78) 
0.0244 
(0.41) 
-0.000764 
(-0.47) 
-0.304 
(-1.92) 
0.155 
(0.35) 
HRG tariff (thousand 
£) 
-0.0115 
(-1.84) 
-0.0154* 
(-2.16) 
-0.000694 
(-0.93) 
0.133 
(0.23) 
0.0344 
(0.68) 
-0.165 
(-1.24) 
0.0205** 
(2.71) 
0.00807 
(0.02) 
-0.222 
(-1.63) 
0.00302 
(1.04) 
0.610 
(1.62) 
0.335 
(0.44) 
Observations 47516 47437 47517 46332 47517 47517 47512 47517 47517 47491 47517 42182 
R2 0.817 0.790 0.982 0.088 0.774 0.446 0.742 0.142 0.857 0.708 0.846 0.550 
Note: Preferred control is based on pre-trend tests and consists of 7 out of 8 of the specialties, Gynaecology is dropped.  
The linear trend coefficient for cholecystectomy tests the pre-trend assumption. The coefficient on the BPT spline is additional to the coefficient on the anticipation spline. 
Bold cells are where the pre-trend assumption is satisfied.   
All models include Trust-specialty fixed effects.  
Observations are Trust-specialty-month combinations. Regressions weighted by volume (except volume regression). 
Provider cluster robust t statistics in parentheses.  
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
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Figure I – trends for selected outcome variables for cholecystectomy and control group   
 
Notes: Series are indexed to their values in the first month. 
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Figure II – Predicted daycase rates from the spline regression model  
  
Notes: Series are indexed to their values in the first month. 
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Appendix  
  
Appendix table I– Difference-in-difference terms using control procedures in each of the eight specialties separately 
Specialty Daycase 
proportion 
Planned 
daycase 
proportion 
Laparoscopic 
proportion 
Readmission 
rate 
Mean 
comorbidities 
Reversion 
rate 
Long stay 
proportion  
Death 
rate 
Mean age Male 
patient 
proportion 
Provider 
volume 
Median 
waiting 
time 
Number of 
episodes 
Ear, nose and 
throat 
0.0302* 
(2.28) 
0.0707*** 
(3.38) 
0.0331** 
(3.34) 
0.0548 
(0.06) 
0.123*** 
(3.69) 
-4.532*** 
(-3.80) 
-0.0531*** 
(-8.87) 
0.0553 
(0.28) 
-0.247 
(-1.53) 
0.00353 
(0.85) 
1.205* 
(2.25) 
1.957 
(0.82) 
181,550 
General 0.0472*** 
(4.62) 
0.102*** 
(7.11) 
0.0301** 
(3.13) 
0.683 
(0.53) 
0.0870** 
(3.14) 
-5.154*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.0341*** 
(-5.99) 
-0.164 
(-0.75) 
-0.120 
(-0.47) 
0.00596 
(0.96) 
1.336** 
(3.20) 
2.157 
(1.56) 
76,669 
 
Gynaecology 0.102*** 
(10.16) 
0.151*** 
(9.38) 
-0.0274* 
(-2.57) 
1.143 
(1.17) 
-0.0590 
(-1.61) 
-5.896*** 
(-4.86) 
-0.0185* 
(-2.30) 
0.126 
(0.63) 
-0.427* 
(-2.05) 
-0.00448 
(-1.37) 
-1.737** 
(-3.09) 
-0.570 
(-0.13) 
141,662 
 
Ophthalmology 0.0449* 
(2.00) 
0.127*** 
(4.91) 
0.0371** 
(3.26) 
-0.379 
(-0.33) 
0.0194 
(0.18) 
-4.250*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.0150 
(-1.05) 
0.0376 
(0.19) 
-0.433* 
(-2.17) 
-0.00496 
(-1.00) 
-0.381 
(-0.62) 
8.592*** 
(4.37) 
94,982 
 
Orthopaedic 0.0762*** 
(8.29) 
0.118*** 
(8.61) 
0.0232** 
(3.32) 
-0.836 
(-0.85) 
0.0268 
(0.78) 
-5.571*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.0411*** 
(-6.41) 
0.0495 
(0.22) 
-
1.111*** 
(-4.87) 
0.0124* 
(2.53) 
0.320 
(0.66) 
1.561 
(0.86) 
137,383 
 
Urology 0.114*** 
(8.41) 
0.156*** 
(8.33) 
0.0364** 
(3.18) 
2.752 
(1.51) 
-0.210*** 
(-3.47) 
-4.269** 
(-3.25) 
-0.0174 
(-1.61) 
0.140 
(0.36) 
-1.163** 
(-3.24) 
0.00261 
(0.65) 
0.985 
(1.90) 
1.771 
(1.03) 
33,365 
 
Vascular 0.0666*** 
(4.95) 
0.120*** 
(6.77) 
0.0320** 
(3.32) 
-1.230 
(-1.40) 
0.0173 
(0.34) 
-4.578*** 
(-3.85) 
-0.0494*** 
(-7.72) 
0.278 
(1.26) 
-
0.860*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.0132* 
(-2.35) 
3.756*** 
(7.04) 
5.752** 
(3.06) 
118,409 
 
Medical 0.0924*** 
(4.08) 
0.156*** 
(6.02) 
0.0280** 
(3.33) 
0.00952 
(0.01) 
-0.476** 
(-2.80) 
-5.214*** 
(-4.26) 
-0.0874*** 
(-3.88) 
-0.444 
(-0.44) 
0.154 
(0.64) 
-0.00646 
(-0.87) 
0.0472 
(0.05) 
1.595 
(0.82) 
54,349 
 
Control group 0.0580*** 
(5.93) 
0.111*** 
(7.31) 
0.0317*** 
(3.36) 
-0.0728 
(-0.10) 
0.0157 
(0.51) 
-4.722*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.0438*** 
(-7.99) 
0.0424 
(0.21) 
-0.537*** 
(-4.58) 
0.00149 
(0.48) 
1.119** 
(2.67) 
3.902** 
(2.83) 
838,369 
Note: Preferred control is based on pre-trend tests and consists of 7 out of 8 of the specialties, Gynaecology is dropped.  
Bold cells are where the pre-trend assumption is satisfied.  
All models include 40 month dummies and Trust-specialty fixed effects.  
Observations are Trust-speciality-month combinations. Regressions weighted by volume (except volume regression). 
Provider cluster robust t statistics in parentheses.  
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Appendix table II – Pre-trend test results for control procedures in each of the eight specialties separately 
Specialty Daycase 
proportion 
Planned 
daycase 
proportion 
Laparoscopic 
proportion 
Readmission 
rate 
Mean 
comorbidities 
Reversion 
rate 
Long stay 
proportion  
Death 
rate 
Mean 
age 
Male patient 
proportion 
Provider 
volume 
Median 
waiting 
time 
Ear, nose and 
throat 
-0.0000819 
(-0.08) 
0.00111 
(0.90) 
0.00145*** 
(3.94) 
0.0211 
(0.23) 
0.00694* 
(2.55) 
0.0381 
(0.38) 
-0.00119* 
(-2.38) 
-
0.00432 
(-0.27) 
0.00470 
(0.27) 
0.0000543 
(0.11) 
0.119* 
(2.47) 
-0.244 
(-1.68) 
General 0.000159 
(0.19) 
0.00151 
(1.38) 
0.00126 
(1.62) 
-0.0283 
(-0.19) 
0.00480 
(1.69) 
-0.0265 
(-0.17) 
-0.000224 
(-0.34) 
-
0.00114 
(-0.04) 
-0.0353 
(-1.43) 
0.00112 
(1.82) 
0.0676* 
(2.08) 
-0.697*** 
(-4.39) 
Gynaecology 0.00244** 
(3.14) 
0.00399*** 
(3.64) 
-0.000991 
(-1.17) 
-0.0710 
(-0.55) 
0.00550 
(1.76) 
0.0208 
(0.18) 
-0.00127 
(-1.79) 
-
0.00932 
(-0.38) 
-
0.0511** 
(-2.61) 
-0.0000301 
(-0.10) 
-0.0821* 
(-2.26) 
-0.360* 
(-2.02) 
Ophthalmology 0.0000282 
(0.02) 
0.00256 
(1.67) 
0.00141*** 
(3.71) 
0.211 
(1.73) 
-0.000710 
(-0.10) 
0.0279 
(0.28) 
0.00185 
(1.69) 
-
0.00749 
(-0.41) 
-
0.00249 
(-0.15) 
-0.000538 
(-0.89) 
-0.0656 
(-1.87) 
-0.218 
(-1.11) 
Orthopaedic 0.000594 
(0.78) 
0.00253* 
(2.37) 
0.00140*** 
(3.69) 
0.0977 
(1.04) 
0.00234 
(0.79) 
-0.00194 
(-0.02) 
-0.00128* 
(-2.04) 
-0.0191 
(-0.77) 
-
0.0717** 
(-3.04) 
0.00103 
(1.88) 
0.0326 
(0.86) 
-0.564*** 
(-3.50) 
Urology 0.00189 
(1.78) 
0.00310* 
(2.39) 
0.000997 
(1.18) 
-0.200 
(-0.90) 
-0.0112* 
(-2.47) 
-0.0859 
(-0.52) 
0.00171 
(1.72) 
-0.0152 
(-0.34) 
-0.0113 
(-0.29) 
0.000217 
(0.37) 
0.0241 
(0.85) 
-0.661** 
(-2.96) 
Vascular -0.000327 
(-0.32) 
0.00236 
(1.77) 
0.00123* 
(2.40) 
0.104 
(0.93) 
0.00340 
(0.92) 
0.000291 
(0.00) 
-0.000623 
(-1.04) 
0.0250 
(0.88) 
-0.0556* 
(-2.24) 
0.000162 
(0.26) 
0.0689 
(1.51) 
-0.300* 
(-2.08) 
Medical -0.000501 
(-0.48) 
0.00261 
(1.90) 
0.00148*** 
(4.02) 
0.0731 
(0.45) 
0.00786 
(1.23) 
0.0122 
(0.12) 
-0.00287** 
(-2.92) 
-0.0965 
(-0.76) 
-0.0481 
(-1.58) 
0.000718 
(0.83) 
0.00801 
(0.16) 
0.0561 
(0.23) 
Control group -0.000203 
(-0.34) 
0.00158 
(1.65) 
0.00159*** 
(3.91) 
0.0813 
(1.17) 
0.00536* 
(2.34) 
0.0417 
(0.43) 
-0.0000832 
(-0.17) 
-
0.00474 
(-0.23) 
-0.0200* 
(-2.05) 
0.0000270 
(0.11) 
0.0751* 
(2.45) 
0.183* 
(2.22) 
Note: Preferred control is based on pre-trend tests and consists of 7 out of 8 of the specialties, Gynaecology is dropped.  
All models include Trust-specialty fixed effects.  
Observations are Trust-specialty-month combinations. Regressions weighted by volume (except volume regression). 
Provider cluster robust t statistics in parentheses.  
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
